In a recent presentation to the Extreme Poverty Research Group (EPRG) I identified the following reasons why, despite the means to achieve this objective being available, it is unlikely that the ambitious objective of rapidly eradicating extreme poverty will be achieved.
The constraints are not essentially to do with cost or technology. Neither do they concern the ever present threat of natural disasters or even of economic slowdown. The main constraints are in my view in the realm of the institutional and governance issues that are at the heart of a dysfunctional development process.
Greed and competition
As mentioned in Part One shiree is a “challenge fund.” This essentially means that the mechanism of competition is used to encourage implementing agencies to develop innovative, robust and potentially high impact project proposals and that, after a rigorous independent evaluation process, only the winning proposals receive funding.
In this case intense competition is regarded as a good thing and central to the achievement of results. However there are many instances where competition has negative consequences that impede development.
Especially in the case of donor funded development, of which I am most familiar, the incentives inherent in the current system are to compete not to cooperate. Hence agencies and individuals compete for donor funds and do not willingly share ideas and good practice, government agencies and civil servants compete for the “goodies” that come with projects (vehicles, overseas trips, training) while even donors themselves, while paying lip service to the idea of coordination, are primarily concerned with attribution of results to their own programme and are loathe to share results or influence.
A project such as the rapid eradication of extreme poverty from Bangladesh that is national in scope and requires effective coordination and pooling of resources behind a common objective is likely to fall victim to the undermining influence of this competition.
Those who cannot work out how they will achieve personal gain from the venture or discern how it will add to the prestige and influence of their own organisation, and enhance their career opportunities within that organisation, will tend to undermine the effort or at best will stay “on the fence.”
Given that achieving the ambitious objective requires all major stakeholders with access to power and resources to be not just passive supporters but active participants, partial or lukewarm support will not be enough.
‘Aidland’ dynamics
The Paris Declaration of 2005 and subsequent international agreements have enshrined a set of principles regarding aid effectiveness – these include national ownership of development processes, alignment of aid programmes with policy and harmonisation of donor support as well as tackling corruption.
In Bangladesh there are too many vested interests involved in sustaining the current fragmented, endemically corrupt and ineffective development process, and the aid effectiveness agenda, although no doubt talked about, is not implemented.
A project or programme to eradicate extreme poverty will require strong national leadership that will knock the donors and implementing agencies, including many government departments, together into a well coordinated unified whole. The likelihood that this will happen is remote.
Entrenched marginalisation
To get rid of extreme poverty means leaving no one behind – this implies that there can be no category of “the undeserving poor” who are excluded from programmes intended to help them.
This requires a massive change of mindset amongst many of the powerful and the elite who control resources. Marginal groups that are typically difficult to reach and in any case lack political clout are likely to continue to be excluded and to remain in extreme poverty – hence the eradication objective will not be achieved.
Furthermore, as the marginalised are excluded from projects and benefits, they are not even counted in most monitoring data and hence this extreme poverty remains invisible and untouched.
Cycle of bad governance
Most of the successful extreme poverty programmes are funded by donors and implemented by NGOs. Government agencies and elected officials will often lend support in implementation but they do not typically have control over critical decisions such as the selection of beneficiaries or the transfer of resources.
In theory, and according to Paris Declaration principles, it would be better if the government of Bangladesh implemented these programmes and donors simply assisted by providing partial funding support through official channels. This is what happens in many other countries where donor support is provided via mainstream government budgets.
A project to eradicate extreme poverty would require perhaps $3bn of resources over a five year period (in addition to increased sectoral support to services such as health and education as well as enhanced social protection).
This quantum of resources is by no means impossible but would need to be a shared commitment from donors, multilateral financial institutions (eg the World Bank, IMF, ADB) and the government.
Hence there would be no question of bypassing government in the manner of several current exclusively donor funded extreme poverty targeted programmes. In essence, the rapid eradication of extreme poverty requires an equally rapid eradication of corruption and inefficiency in core elements of the public sector – the second challenge far exceeds the first and makes the poverty reduction objective unrealistic.
Unwillingness to admit failure
Development projects in Bangladesh never seem to fail, or at least one never hears about the failures! This is strange because from working in the country for nine years, including a few project evaluation missions, I know of many projects that have been badly designed, badly implemented and lacking in any noticeable impact. In fact I would have to admit that several projects I have worked on have failed, for whatever reason, to fully achieve their objectives.
An inability to recognise failure implies an inability to learn. For donor funded projects there seems to be no noticeable relationship between success or failure and the likelihood of replication or of closure.
Hence many awful projects exhibiting low impact for money are continued into a further phase or scaled up because they fit the prevailing donor agenda, while some that are demonstrable successes or which have struggled to become successful after long periods of learning are summarily closed down or totally revamped because the development narrative or fashion has moved on. There are countless critical evaluation reports that have never been released or have been redrafted again and again until the conclusions are totally anodyne.
Furthermore key donor personnel recycle every three or four years, the incomers with a new agenda and priorities have no interest in “digging up past history” while local staff have no incentive in bringing past failure to their attention.
Given the intense competition mentioned above the incentive for NGOs and other implementing agencies is to either falsify or sugar coat monitoring results and they have developed many ways of achieving this end. The numerous development projects in the government sector are no better, with evaluation seeming to be an entirely politically driven process.
One may argue that a solution is totally independent evaluation. In my experience, this is not only hugely expensive but no less subject to manipulation, cover up or being pliable to client expectations.
What is needed is not more money spent on evaluation but a culture where honest and transparent evaluation is itself valued, including recognition of both success and failure. This would allow adaptive programming, with frequent and effective adjustment of programme implementation.
The tools to achieve this real time monitoring, and hence real time learning, exist but the development sector is stuck in, or simply prefers, a paradigm of heavily adjusted and selectively revealed monitoring.
Similar issues affect public service provision and this problem would fatally undermine any attempt to achieve the eradication of extreme poverty – that is in reality rather than as a fantasy outcome based on false data.
The above list of constraints to achievement is based on 25 years experience working in development in Bangladesh and elsewhere. If I am proved wrong and these issues do not prevent the realisation of the ambitious policy objective myself, and several million others, will be delighted.