The most persecuted minority in the world

The Burmese (Myanmar) government’s latest salvo against the hapless Rohingyas, by denying them voting rights, may have created another episode in the endless saga of this community’s distressed existence. But for Bangladesh, the news of disenfranchising the community on the ground that it does not belong to one of about 135 ethnic groups of Myanmar (former Burma), does not augur well.

We have had our share of their misfortune for the last four decades, and continue to do so mainly due to the repressive policy of the Myanmar government, and due to the politics the Rohingyas have been thrust into in the past decades. In 1978, Bangladesh saw the first big exodus of Rohingyas into the country.

Although most of the refugees departed for their home after mutual agreement between Myanmar and Bangladesh in less than two years, a new influx of refugees of Rohingyas would haunt Bangladesh 12 years later. The latest development in Myanmar is naturally ominous for Bangladesh. What can we do to prevent an even greater influx of Rohingyas should the Myanmar authorities continue down the path that they have followed in the past toward this hapless community?

It is not entirely clear whether the repressive policy led the Rohingyas to internationalise their struggle and plight, or whether the slightly militant response from them to establish their rights - including an audacious demand for a separate homeland once upon a time - led to this unfortunate outcome. But the fact remains that there is a huge chunk of population in Myanmar’s Arakan province that remains in a state of limbo in their own country.

By unofficial count, this chunk is close to two million, of which a significant portion left as refugees to other countries including Bangladesh. The group has lived in Arakan region for several centuries, but had never blended in with the Rakhine majority, mainly because of their ethnic difference from the local majority, but also due to the fact that their religion is Islam. They claimed and remained a community with an affinity to Islam as a religion, and Bangali as their ethnicity. Both identities seem to be an anathema for the larger community in the region the Rohingyas belong to. The majority ethnic group, the Rakhines, look upon them as intruders, and the Burmese authorities seem to concur with this.

Curiously, for a long period, neither ethnicity, which is Bangali, nor religion had posed any great problem of co-existence for the Rohingyas with Rakhines or Moghs in local parlance in Arakan. Historically, Muslim settlement in Arakan in an ostensible way began in the nineteenth century during the British period; although the Rohingyas claim that the settlement began at the same time as Bengal with Arab merchants’ visits to the area.

However, Muslim settlement in a major way began for economic reasons with demand for seasonal agricultural labour in Arakan. The major ethnic community, the Moghs, was agriculture averse and preferred fishing more as a livelihood. To mitigate labour crisis during sowing and harvesting season, the land owning Moghs depended heavily on agricultural skills of the Muslim migrants.

With the need for labour growing in Arakan, slowly a labour market developed where the needy Muslims from neighbouring Chittagong district of the then East Bengal, and later East Pakistan found good seasonal employment.

The peaceful co-existence between the two ethnic communities started to show cracks when the seasonal labour turned their transient and migratory life to more permanent status. This happened through a mix of factors such as migrant’s marriage with Arakan Muslims of the area, and the initial lack of any opposition from the local majority to their continuation in the region ad infinitum.

It probably would have remained that way had it not been due to the Burmese government strife against various regional ethnic groups to stifle their demands for sovereignty, and gradual politicisation of the Rohingyas themselves. Although not as fierce as Karens, Shans, or Chins who fight the Burmese government even today for independence of their respective regions, the Arakanese also had formed their parties such as Arakan Liberation Party, Rakhine Liberation Party, and even had a militia called Arakan Liberation Army.

In trying to subdue the Arakanese demand for sovereignty, the Burmese government found the Rohingyas to be another group that was trying to establish their own separate identity. The Rohingyas had no problem as long as they worked as serfs. But the trouble began when they tried to assert their rights as citizens and a good number of them found that they were not so. The Burmese army found the majority Rakhines were equally unfriendly and even hostile to the Rohingyas.

The first onslaught on the Rohingyas came in 1978, when the Burmese government began Operation Dragon King to drive out people who did not possess citizen registration card under the Citizens Registration Act. Since a majority of the Arakan Muslims did not have the certificate (because they were not deemed to be legal citizens) they became targets of arrest and deportation.

The majority Rakhines who began to consider the Rohingyas as threats and illegal immigrants, took part in the attacks on the Rohingyas. The push of 1978 led to over 200,000 Rohingyas migrating to Chittagong. The refugees were confined to Cox’s Bazar region in 13 camps, where they were sheltered and fed with support from UNHCR, and some other international relief agencies.

The Bangladesh government at that time solved the problem diplomatically with patient dialogue with the Burmese government, and almost all of the refugees were repatriated. Unfortunately, 12 years later, conflict between the Rakhines and Rohingyas would recur and another 300,000 Rohingyas would flee to Bangladesh. In this round, negotiations between the countries were more difficult and much slower.

Some of the refugees were repatriated, but a substantial number still remains. The prospects of all these refugees leaving for Myanmar are not good, and the policies that Myanmar has adopted do not indicate that they are welcome in Arakan.

The Rohingya situation has been made more complex by politics. They have claimed to be a separate and distinct ethnic group in Arakan, which the Myanmar government denies. They have tried to enlist support of other Muslim countries to their cause, notably Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. In fact, Pakistani support to the Rohingyas dates back to the fifties and sixties. Pakistan established a consular office in Arakan mainly to liaise with the Muslims of Arakan.

In 1978 while handling the first Rohingya influx in Chittagong as Deputy Commissioner, I had met many older refugees who eulogised Pakistan and considered it to be their real friend. In fact, it was widely believed that support for the armed Rohingya Liberation Front came from that country’s intelligence branch.

Saudi Arabia helped the community financially through its charitable wing, Rabeta-e-Al Islami. I had met many of the leaders of the community, living in Arakan, who identified themselves primarily as Muslims. But a more disturbing thought for me was the potential of the group to be a proselytiser for radicalism.

The Rohingya conflict poses both a moral and political dilemma for Bangladesh. Morally, Bangladesh cannot condone denial of human rights to the Rohingyas and their oppression by their own government. Politically, however, any strong vocal support to their cause is fraught with both the danger of allowing more influx in our territory and incurring displeasure of a close neighbour.

Bangladesh cannot and should not internationalise this issue but find ways to work with the Myanmar government to prevent further exodus to Bangladesh. The issue of whether the Rohingyas are a distinct ethnic community among many in Myanmar and whether they should be given voting rights is for the Myanmar government to decide. But we can urge Myanmar authorities to take steps to prevent their migration to Bangladesh. Our objectives in this should be mutually supportive.