The uncertainty surrounding Bangladesh Prime Minister Tarique Rahman’s visit to India and Dhaka’s growing interest in the Makkah Defense Pact are being viewed as possible signs of a shift in Bangladesh’s foreign-policy calculations. But for Tarique Rahman, this is unlikely to be a sudden or whimsical decision. Politically, it appears to be a carefully calculated move.
The proposed India visit has yet to take place, despite an invitation from New Delhi and discussions over possible dates. But the timing has become complicated.
The uncertainty reflects how difficult India-Bangladesh relations have become since Sheikh Hasina was ousted in August 2024 and fled to India.
Her continued stay in India has become one of the biggest contentious issues between the two neighbours. Bangladesh has repeatedly sought her extradition after a tribunal sentenced her to death in absentia in November 2025 over her role in the deadly crackdown on the 2024 student-led uprising. Hasina has rejected the proceedings as politically motivated.
Against this backdrop, anti-India sentiment grew in Bangladesh after the fall of the Awami League government. “Delhi or Dhaka? Dhaka, Dhaka” became a popular political slogan, reflecting a growing perception among sections of the public that Bangladesh should reduce its dependence on India.
But the BNP government cannot simply turn away from New Delhi.
India is Bangladesh’s most important geographical neighbour, sharing a more than 4,000-kilometre border and deep economic, security, and cultural ties. Whatever political differences exist between the two governments, geography makes a working relationship unavoidable.
That makes Rahman’s decision over an India visit particularly sensitive.
On August 5, Hasina, speaking from India in her first media interaction since her ouster, said she intended to return to Bangladesh in December. She said she was prepared to face detention or even death.
Among the questions from journalists was whether she would visit the shrine of Nizamuddin Auliya in Delhi before returning to Bangladesh. Hasina responded positively.
Visiting religious shrines, particularly Islamic shrines, is not new for Bangladeshi politicians. Before national election campaigns, leaders from major political parties often visit shrines, both as a cultural tradition and as a way of connecting with voters.
Around 90% of Bangladesh’s population is Muslim, and political parties have long sought to tap into religious sentiment when building support for major political moves.
Meanwhile, Hasina’s remarks triggered a sharp reaction from Dhaka, which criticized India for allowing her to address the media from its territory.
For Rahman, visiting India while Hasina remains there therefore carries an obvious political risk.
His government emerged from the political forces that opposed Hasina and her Awami League. A visit to New Delhi at this moment could raise questions among those forces about whether Dhaka was making concessions over Hasina or seeking a political accommodation with India.
It could create mistrust, or even divisions, among the pro-July forces.
Rahman therefore appears to have little political incentive to take that risk at this stage. Instead, he appears intent on keeping the pro-July forces together, despite their differences, as they seek to politically counter the Awami League in the coming days, much as they did in 2024.
And then came another event.
Saudi Crown Prince and Prime Minister Mohammed bin Salman invited Rahman to visit Saudi Arabia. Saudi Ambassador Abdullah Zafer H bin Abiyah delivered the invitation on August 17.
The invitation came at a time when Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Pakistan had signed the much-discussed Makkah Joint Defense Agreement.
Signed in Makkah on August 7, the agreement states that an armed attack against any one of the three countries would be regarded as an attack against all three, making it similar in principle to NATO’s collective-defense clause.
The defense pact could also expand beyond its three founding members. Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan has said Egypt is the most likely next member, noting that the four countries already cooperate like alliance partners. Turkey has also said the pact is not directed against any country, including Iran, and does not replace existing alliances.
The Makkah Agreement has inevitably drawn comparisons with the Cold War-era Central Treaty Organization, or CENTO, which included Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, Iraq, and Britain. Although the United States supported CENTO through bilateral defense agreements, it never became a member. The alliance ultimately failed to develop an effective collective defense mechanism and dissolved in 1979 following Iran’s revolution.
That history raises questions about whether the Makkah Agreement could face similar challenges.
For Bangladesh, however, the more immediate question is why it would want to join such a pact.
Dhaka has expressed interest in joining, but it has not received an invitation.
“If they express an intention to include Bangladesh in the pact, we will certainly consider it positively,” Foreign Minister Khalilur Rahman told parliament on August 27. He also made clear that Bangladesh’s inclusion was not currently under discussion.
That distinction is important. Bangladesh is not joining the Makkah Pact. It is signaling that it would consider joining if invited.
Yet even that signal is politically significant.
The pact brings together three countries with very different strategic interests but substantial military and political weight. For Bangladesh, closer engagement with them could open another channel of diplomacy beyond its traditional relationships with India, China, the United States, and Japan.
But it could also complicate those relationships.
A gamble for Bangladesh
For a developing Asian country like Bangladesh, the central question is simple: What security problem would joining the Makkah Pact actually solve?
Bangladesh does not face the same immediate security environment as Saudi Arabia, Turkey, or Pakistan. It is not in the Middle East and does not face the regional military threats that shaped the pact.
Its security concerns are primarily regional, including its relationship with India, border management, maritime security, and the wider stability of the Bay of Bengal.
Joining a defense pact centered on countries thousands of kilometres away would therefore require a clear strategic justification.
There could be benefits.
Bangladesh is a Muslim-majority country of more than 170 million people and has deep economic and social links with the Gulf.
Millions of Bangladeshis work in the Middle East, making Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states important sources of remittances.
Closer relations could therefore bring economic as well as diplomatic benefits.
The pact could also give Dhaka another platform through which to engage with influential Muslim-majority countries.
But the risks may be greater than the immediate security benefits.
India is likely to watch Bangladesh’s interests in possible participation closely. New Delhi has a longstanding strategic rivalry with Pakistan, while India and Bangladesh share a border of more than 4,000 kilometres.
The growing military ties between Dhaka and Islamabad in the last two years have also raised concerns in New Delhi. India has previously accused Bangladesh of allowing northeastern Indian insurgents to operate from its territory, allegedly with Pakistani support. Bangladesh and Pakistan denied those allegations.
For Dhaka, the challenge is therefore to deepen ties with Pakistan and the wider Muslim world without allowing India to see the move as a strategic alignment against it.
India is Bangladesh’s neighbour and cannot be replaced by a distant strategic partner. Saudi Arabia is an important economic and religious partner, but it cannot offer Bangladesh what India does simply because of geography.
Pakistan, meanwhile, carries its own complicated history with Bangladesh.
The Makkah Pact could nevertheless give Rahman additional diplomatic space if he uses it as part of a broader strategy of diversification. But if it becomes a perceived anti-India or pro-Pakistan alignment, it could create exactly the kind of regional tensions Bangladesh has traditionally sought to avoid.
This is where the political gamble lies.
For Rahman, the Makkah Pact could also prove to be a politically useful card at home, particularly for mobilizing support among anti-India groups and Bangladesh’s Muslim majority ahead of Hasina’s planned return.
And in Bangladesh, this kind of political symbolism is not unusual.
Even former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina was given the title “Qawmi Janani,” or “Mother of Qawmi,” ahead of the 2018 general elections after her government formally recognized Qawmi madrasa degrees.
Prime Minister Tarique Rahman also met Hefazat Ameer Shah Muhibullah Babunagari in Chittagong on August 9, asking the religious pressure group to continue its support for the BNP.
With this signal on the Makkah Pact, it would not be surprising if a new slogan emerged on the streets of Dhaka: “Delhi or Makkah? Makkah, Makkah.” Whether such a slogan actually emerges remains to be seen, but the political narrative is already taking shape.
The move could help bring the pro-July forces together to counter the Awami League as Hasina’s expected return in December approaches.
In fact, BNP’s calculated view toward Makkah, and its attempt to connect Bangladesh’s foreign policy with the symbolism of Islam’s holiest city, could do more than solidify the position among Islamist groups, even the parliamentary opposition party Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami, which has welcomed the idea of Bangladesh considering participation in the pact.
And that could certainly become a political test of Sheikh Hasina’s determination to return to Dhaka.
In Bangladesh’s complex political landscape, where religion and politics remain deeply intertwined, this diplomatic dance carries consequences far beyond international relations.
For Tarique Rahman, it is a gamble over both foreign policy and domestic political supremacy.
Sardar Ronie is a Bangladesh-based journalist with nearly 16 years of experience covering politics, human rights, and regional issues for international outlets including BBC News, DW Asia, and Al Arabiya English, bringing stories from the ground to global audiences. He can be reached at sardarronie@gmail.com.