Both the Rohingya and the people of Bangladesh have already heard a lot of promises and dialogues, and witnessed many initiatives to repatriate the Rohingya.
Soon, they realized that the unfulfilled promises and unrealized conversations simply increased the confidence of the Myanmar’s junta in continuing their atrocities against the Rohingya and plotting the game of trust traps.
August 25, 2026 is the ninth year of the Rohingya Genocide Remembrance. If we critically and objectively review the events that took place with the Rohingya in the past nine years, we see how the situation has deteriorated gradually, showing little or no hope for repatriation. Bangladesh could not repatriate a single Rohingya in the last nine years and rather, it kept accepting more Rohingya from Myanmar almost on a regular basis, even in 2026.
On the one hand, we could not show our strength to Myanmar, as well as to the rest of the world, by exercising bilateral or multilateral or track diplomacy. On the other hand, the “mighty” countries have continued showing interest in sending relief to the Rohingya in Bangladesh instead of standing beside Bangladesh to repatriate them, and investing more in trade with Myanmar.
Bangladesh has been dealing with refugees for over four decades without any national refugee policy. Time has come now to end this adhocism. In order to play bold and safe in this complicated field of Rohingya repatriation, the 11-member National Strategy Formulation Committee on Rohingya Affairs must remember a few points.
Utilizing the history of Rohingya political leaders
We have failed to explore and reveal the history, culture, and strong records of the existence of the Rohingya in Myanmar as an indigenous people of Myanmar, particularly of Arakan.
Their history has been preserved in international museums and archives, although Myanmar demolished their histories from the record of Myanmar.
Bangladesh could have utilized the history of the Rohingya political leaders and MPs in Myanmar such as Sultan Ahmed who won from Maungdaw-1 constituency in 1951 general election, both Nur Ahmed (Tin Maung) who won from Buthidang-2 and U Fazal Ahmed who won from Maungdaw-2 contested in 1990 general election, and many other to let the world know that the Rohingya originated in Myanmar.
Challenging Myanmar’s narratives
The narrative publicly introduced by President Thein Sein against the Rohingya was repeatedly used by the military junta.
General Min Aung Hlaing has characterized the Rohingya as “Bengalis,” claiming that they were brought into Arakan as agricultural labourers during British colonial rule and some others entered illegally from Bangladesh.
His regime has refused to recognize the word “Rohingya” and continued labeling them as “Bengali.”
If Myanmar claims that the Rohingya are illegal Bengali migrants entered from Bangladesh, then Bangladesh could have directly asked Myanmar to show evidence on when, how, and how many alleged migrants entered Myanmar from Bangladesh.
Along with other complex political dynamics, Bangladesh’s silence until 2026 on this has created serious obstacles to resolving the Rohingya crisis.
Dhaka has now rejected Myanmar's “Bengali” label for Rohingya recently. State Minister for Foreign Affairs Shama Obaed said that Bangladesh does not agree with Myanmar's description of Rohingya as "Bengalis," as they have their own identity and will return to Myanmar with that identity.
Bangladesh should stick to this point directly and boldly. Bangladesh is an independent country, and its citizens enjoy their own rights and legal identity. Why would Bangladeshi people go to Myanmar?
If Myanmar claims that the Rohingya are Bangladeshi migrants who entered Myanmar illegally, it should provide credible evidence of that claim.
From 1992-2012, during the operational period of NaSaKa, Myanmar has not found a single case of illegal entrance from Bangladesh.
If millions of people had crossed from Bangladesh into Myanmar in the manner now claimed, there should be substantial evidence documenting such movement.
The absence of credible evidence for the scale of migration alleged by Myanmar should be seriously questioned by Bangladesh.
What is the verification for?
The project of verification of the Rohingya identity is a trust trap. Bangladesh never asked Myanmar about the reason for verification for the people who were one of the population groups of Myanmar -- historically, politically, and socially.
One practical source of evidence would be the population records maintained at the village level. Rohingya village administrators in Maungdaw, Buthidaung, and Rathedaung townships have their village-resident lists, and many of these administrators were appointed by the Myanmar authorities themselves.
These local records could provide valuable evidence on how many Rohingya fled from those villages. Can Bangladesh not challenge this verification game by referring to those lists? If these people are Bengali, why does Myanmar verify their identity to repatriate them?
Why has repatriation repeatedly failed?
Bangladesh and Myanmar have discussed repatriation several times and attempted to begin pilot repatriation. Yet these efforts have failed repeatedly. What conditions have made their return impossible?
First, it is often said that the situation in Arakan is “not conducive” for repatriation. But who will make the ground conducive if there is no meaningful intervention?
A conflict-affected area does not automatically become peaceful and stable without political, diplomatic, humanitarian, and security efforts to create those conditions.
In addition, for sustainable repatriation, there are important roles of the international community and regional forums such as ASEAN and OIC.
Unfortunately, while people are killed and raped, houses are burned,, the regional forums remain almost mute because of their principal of non-interference.
Second, there is currently no stable state authority capable of guaranteeing a safe return. Although Bangladesh and Myanmar have attempted to move forward with repatriation arrangements, the Myanmar junta was not honest about repatriating while they had control in northern Rakhine State until 2024.
Now the situation on the ground has dramatically changed. Much of Arakan townships are now controlled by the Arakan Army (AA) and its political wing, the United League of Arakan (ULA). Before proceeding with any realistic repatriation process, the most complicated issue is dealing with AA that controls most of the land in Arakan where the Rohingya would actually return.
Today, AA is denying the Rohingya exactly the same way junta did. Although the military and AA have been fighting as enemies, they are the same on the Rohingya issue.
Until now, a Rohingya needs a different permission letter every five miles to move within Arakan. Moreover, AA has been arresting educated Rohingya by accusing them of collaborating with the Rohingya armed groups.
Young girls and boys, even the children, are forced to work as porters and labour as well as fight in the frontline.
Bangladesh has missed the train several times. In 2024, when Myanmar's military fled here, they were treated warmly and handed over to Myanmar safely. It was a great opportunity to investigate the crisis and strategize the matter of repatriation using their testimonies.
Ultimately, the Rohingya crisis cannot be solved simply by arranging buses and sending people back across the border. Nor will it be solved by sending them to Bhashan Char.
Repatriation is not merely a physical return. It means safe, voluntary, dignified, and sustainable return with citizenship, equality, security, freedom of movement, and full rights.
For that, what we seriously need is a refugee policy.
Dr Ishrat Zakia Sultana is an Associate Professor, Sociology, North South University. Ahtaram Shin is an Independent Journalist and Editor of Rohingyatographer.