A progressive Bangladesh characterized by pluralism, secularism, and the rule of law will, at some point, have to be fought for in a national election. In the last month, I have seen Bangladeshi progressives alienate their staunchest potential political allies, rehabilitate their sworn ideological adversaries, and debar themselves from recruiting sympathetic members of the Awami League political infrastructure to their cause.
My concern is the way in which the history of the present currently being written distinguishes between change and continuity. I see narratives spreading since the fall of Hasina that fail dreadfully on this score, to which many progressives seem to subscribe.
There is little evidence for the narrative that the nationwide violence against minorities that erupted after August 5 was purely political, and not communal. No-one has inquired of the perpetrators themselves what their motivations were. Prothom Alo provides the most rigorous account to date: between August 5 and 20, 1,068 houses and businesses belonging to minorities were damaged to some degree, and 22 houses of worship were attacked.
It is no criticism of this singular reporting to observe that it is painfully incomplete, and that organizations with the funding and mandate to conduct systematic investigations have failed to do so.
It is highly problematic to insist, as this narrative does, on the separability of ethno-religious factors and party-political affiliation. The disproportionate support for the Awami League among minorities is well noted historically. Of the existing duopoly, only the Awami League has even a rhetorical commitment to secularism and pluralism and this rhetoric was not honoured solely in the breach: The Vested Property Return (Amendment) Acts of 2011 and 2013 are important legislative achievements.
In the absence of evidence to the contrary, there is every reason to assume communalism was at work because, historically, this has always been the case. As one Indigenous friend put it to me: “We are always collateral damage.”
Had those subscribing to the narrative thought it through in historical terms, they might realize it pays a fulsome compliment to the recently deposed regime. If politics alone was to blame for this type of violence, it would be the first time in Bangladesh’s history, a major watershed by any measure.
Whatever its crimes, for accuracy’s sake should we therefore credit the fallen dictatorship with a historic rise in intercommunal tolerance? Obviously, we should not. We should instead recognize the remorseless continuity linking the present day and the decades prior to 2008, captured perfectly by the Indigenous musical collective Madal: “Oh dear Motherland, how much longer will I bleed in your chest?”
Today I saw attempts to distort the obvious truth of settler violence in Dighinala and Rangamati to fit the needs of this new revolutionary history. For Indigenous Peoples, however, these attacks are no aberration, no peculiar product of present circumstances, instigated by nameless provocateurs for the sole purpose of undermining the “Second Liberation.”
They are simply the latest episode in a chain of misery stretching back before Bangladesh. Apparently the subaltern canspeak and she is wrong. She must be, because if she is right then the chief adviser’s rhetoric about the end of a “second occupation” is not true.
I witnessed the election of December 29, 2008. I remember that Hasina then was the new dawn breaking, and her government the latest utopia. I remember how her failures and crimes, when they became apparent, were viewed as such because they represented continuity with the past, and not some drastic change.
At the time of that election, the families of Piren Snal, Cholesh Ritchil, and Alfred Soren were already “still-waiting” for their killers to be brought to justice. Kalpana Chakma’s disappearance was into its second decade without investigation. It is clear how deeply Gidita Rema’s murder in 2001 must be buried if a Google search of her name in English returns no results.
I remember shootings in Chapai. I remember the quiet, level tones a colleague used to describe how Hindu parents begged the men who had come to rape their daughters to do so one at a time, this again in North Bengal. Activists in 2009 spoke of long years facing death threats and worse.
I swiftly developed the understanding I hold to today, that the degree of harassment faced by social workers of all stripes under different governments is a reliable gauge of their integrity. Assassination was the highest compliment previous regimes paid to heroism, and this is not to denigrate the bravery of those who had both of their legs broken, or survived water-boarding.
There is no need to rely on my personal recollections. A human rights report from 2005 states: “Bangladesh has the sad record of being … among the most dangerous countries in the world … for journalists.” The conflict between 1975-1997 involved countless acts by the Bangladesh army that can only be sensibly viewed as war crimes.
A list of atrocities limited to January to October of 1990 discussed in another human rights report includes 23 occasions where army operations involved the looting and burning of houses. The arrest of 173 Indigenous Peoples led to four being tortured to death, and two fatally shot, while in custody. According to the authors, this likely represented only a fraction of the crimes committed in 1990 alone.
Ziaur Rahman carved an air force bombing range out of Madhupur Forest; Ershad took as much as a third of the remainder for his rubber plantation. Both acts involved the destruction, in whole or in part, of Garo villages and the displacement of the inhabitants. This coincided with the dramatic rise of false legal cases against the Indigenous population, on charges of deforestation. Thousands of these cases continue today.
The first plan to expel the Indigenous Peoples en masse was Ershad’s. Khaleda Zia took up the task in 2001, resulting in a five-year siege of the area, and mass firings that killed Piren and crippled Utpol Nokrek. As in the case of communal violence after August 5, a definitive list of those wounded and wrongfully imprisoned during Madhupur’s Eco-Park Movement has, to my knowledge, yet to be compiled.
This remains a wholly inadequate account of even the history we do know, for which I beg the pardon of friends from northern Mymensingh, Sylhet, Dinajpur, Rajshahi, or Patuakhali. It is, I hope, the minimum sufficient to underscore two questions:
Hasina intensified the bipolar political struggle to new extremes, though there is no consensus among Bangladeshis I have spoken with that the BNP was entirely blameless. She centralized power to an unparalleled degree, including a dramatic increase in state surveillance. I wonder though, if this can all be safely laid at her door, or whether it was practically an inevitable result of increasing state capacity, and the emergence of new technologies.
Counterfactuals are impossible to prove, and some may argue that Ershad or Khaleda Zia would have chastely denied themselves the powers and abuses offered by the Cyber Security Act had they been in Hasina’s position. I have my doubts, and the proposition may be tested before too long.
The one significant rupture with the past that I can see was the regime’s willingness to use violence against the Dhaka-based, predominantly Muslim-Bengali middle classes. Aijaz Ahmad once observed that post-coloniality was a matter of class.
The same is true for current perceptions of liberation, if we add ethno-religious distinctions. This was clear to me, after August 5. Videos of celebration from Mirpur and Gulshan on social media grated against phone conversations where friends in Rajshahi and Haluaghat described terror during the night, attacks on homes, death threats, and flight to the jungle.
This is before we consider gender. The most common form of autocracy experienced by Bangladeshi citizens is that which exists within the household. Hasina did not invent it, and I see no prospect of its imminent dissolution.
The final distinction is obviously partisan allegiance, the flip side of the narrative that violence after August 5 was “only” a pogrom of political vengeance. It is unlikely that Awami League supporters have been reassured by calls for the rule of law to prevail and culprits to be brought to justice that lack any discernible conviction or practical result.
Polemic from certain progressives seems on the point of drawing up lists of names for proscription, according to some purity principle. I cannot recall an exercise of this kind that ended well, and it will not help reduce the extreme polarization in Bangladesh’s politics that Hasina so exacerbated.
Renouncing polarization would logically require a general amnesty, consistent with truth and reconciliation approaches to peacebuilding, for those Awami League cadres and supporters who had no direct role in the crimes of the regime.
Speaking personally, I will always hold the view that this category includes a large number of very good people, who did what they could to better the lives of their communities and constituents. Progressives who reject this argument are ignoring how generous their granting of amnesty has already been.
The view of Hasina as a unique monster, instead of merely the latest in a grim bestiary, absolves her predecessors and their henchmen of their own crimes. Those who hold to beliefs of our common humanity cannot entertain distinctions between the pain of Hasina’s many victims and the pain of either what came before, or this sorrowful present that bleeds still, in spite of her fall.
Nor are such distinctions compatible with a definition of a “Bangladeshi citizen” that insists on equality under the law, which guarantees “fundamental human rights and freedom, equality and justice,” regardless of ethnicity, religion, gender, or creed.
It is of course possible that finally establishing such a definition in practice can be safely left to the BNP, in alliance with a Jamaat-e-Islami party which, if recent polls are accurate, has tripled its support since 2008. Those who are doubtful of the prospect should recognize this outcome must be contested politically, even if this means surrendering the purity of being “above politics.”
You cannot oppose something with nothing. Achieving a decisive break from the existing duopoly will require a new “progressive” political party. Turnout in the 2008 election was over 87%. There is no hidden army of apathetic liberals from among that cohort waiting to be rallied.
Assuming some hardcore supporters will never abandon the Awami League or the BNP, any new party must take voters from both. They must also win support from new generations of voters, the youngest of which cannot have been more than four years old in 2008, whose understanding of their own country’s history is so poorly served by these narratives.
I have no idea just how hard this will be, but my assumption is that minorities will reliably, disproportionately support pluralism, and skilled political workers ideologically committed to a progressive agenda will most easily be found among the ranks of the Awami League.
Abandoning the dubious narratives surrounding the revolution is a prerequisite for securing the support of both constituencies, as well as ensuring that the decisions of those who have only known Hasina are informed by an accurate record of what came before.
However hard the task facing progressives might be, they will make it no easier by alienating their allies, and strengthening their adversaries.
Dr Oliver Scanlan is a freelance researcher based in the UK. He lived, studied and worked in Bangladesh in 2008 – 2011, 2014 and 2018 – 2022.