In the recent history of Myanmar’s military rule, the Junta never faced such a critical situation, both militarily and politically. The mainstay of Junta is their military power with which they crushed all kinds of oppositions and their legitimacy is that without the military at the core of power, the Union of Myanmar shall break apart.
Recent attacks of Ethnic Armed Organization (EAOs) on Junta’s camps and outposts have challenged the robustness of Tatmadaw (Myanmar Armed Forces). What is more puzzling is that earlier such attacks were only around the bordering areas on security forces’ outposts. Now, aside from bordering areas, the capturing of townships and attacks in the centre of the country, like establishments around Mandalay, have surprised many. The other issue is that the Myanmar military in power has brought the Union to the brink of fragility.
Current developments
The three brotherhood alliance (Arakan Army -- AA; Myanmar Democratic Alliance Army -- MNDAA; and Ta’ang National Liberation Army -- TNLA) started attacking security forces’ posts on October 27, 2023, under code name “Operations 1027” in northern Shan State bordering China as well as in Rakhine, an eastern state bordering Bangladesh. It seems a number of EAOs have joined this operation simultaneously in Kachin, Kayah, Sagaing, Chin, and other places.
These coordinated attacks have overwhelmed the decision making cycle of Tatmadaw -- at least the paralysis in response exhibits so. Over 200 posts have been overrun, and a dozen townships have fallen in the hands of EAOs including important segments of border trade routes and trade/crossing posts with China, Thailand and India.
Aside from political impacts, this will also have economic consequences for the Junta. Almost 52% of Myanmar is under effective control of EAOs. Of course, this does not mean days of Tatmadaw are over, they are still in control and materially much stronger than EAOs, but looks like its “morale component” has weakened since even the forces at military outposts are surrendering without putting up much resistance.
What is Tatmadaw/Junta expected to do?
The Junta is likely to observe the situation and will not panic or hurry. It will possibly go for a “carrot-and-stick” policy and an “amity-enmity” policy with EAOs, meaning it will negotiate with some and fight some, contain some and dislodge some, as it cannot be strong everywhere and would not also dissipate its forces. It will rely on artillery and airpower to compensate for ground weakness. It is already failing to reinforce ground fighting units due to shortage of manpower.
We might observe Tatmadaw giving up less important territory and strengthening vital grounds, offering concessions to chosen EAOs -- which was never anticipated earlier. We are likely to see them taking China’s concerns seriously. It is already evident that Junta is not reacting much in Shan State against MNDAA and TNLA (as their area of operations are in borders with China) but has taken up “Four Cut Strategy” (food, medicine, movement restriction between townships and between states) against AA in Rakhine putting them on the back foot logistically, causing suffering for the population that is likely to bring AA to maintain status quo.
The other reasonable assumption is that taking actions against other EAOs would likely mean creating uncertainty in Chinese, Indian, and Thai borders with Myanmar. This is the moment Junta would try to avoid by not causing instability and remaining in a containment role. AA is at the Bangladesh border and Junta would not hesitate to show their military arrogance in Rakhine having experienced the limitations of Dhaka.
The China factor
There is a China factor in these coordinated operations of EAOs. In Shan State at ethnic-Chinese populated Kokang region (bordering China), casinos, illicit businesses of many facets, and cyber scam centres all developed exponentially and mostly Chinese citizens were getting trapped and being held against their will. Myanmar Junta ignored repeated requests from China to take measures. Reportedly the Junta in general, and Senior Gen Ming Aung Hla in particular, have interests in the area and the Junta was reluctant to take any visible actions. China was facing criticism from within for failing to address the issue. It was turning into a nontraditional security crisis in Yunnan Province.
Apart from this, in recent times Junta seemed to be remarkably diversifying its defense procurement, tilting heavily towards the Russian side. More so, military and political cooperation with Russia have increased in manifolds. Naturally China would not like to be an alternative after so much investment in Junta and Myanmar, after all its “economic and energy corridor” for China. However, China would only go that far in twisting Junta’s arms through EAOs where it can be tamed, at the same time limiting EAOs operational flexibility up to a line where balance of power is drawn between Junta and EAOs that ensures China’s strategic interest in Myanmar.
China would not like capitulations of Tatmadaw and the power shifting to the Western leaning National Unity Government (NUG) without being sure that NUG would protect the Chinese interests in Myanmar. However, we might see in such a scenario, China maintaining relations with both EAOs and NUG after the possible fall of Junta. As Chinese stakes in Myanmar are so heavy that relying on one side would be strategically risky, particularly for Belt and Road Initiatives and access to the Indian Ocean.
The India factor
India has not shown much reaction except traditional diplomatic vocabulary of concerns. However, she would be cautious to take sides at this point since India would not like Junta totally falling into the fold of China. India understands that bringing down Tatmadaw with EAOs capturing some posts and townships around borders is not good enough. The move to support EAOs, including NUG, could be premature for New Delhi.
However, we have seen India handing over Tatmadaw soldiers to Junta who fled the recent fighting and took shelter in India. India has also housed a good number of refugees as a consequence of recent armed conflict in Chin and Sagaing states. India has to maintain a balanced approach.
India could effectively control its own dissident groups along the Myanmar border with active support of Junta. Having official relations with the Junta because of strategic interest (Kaladan Project, India-Myanmar-Thailand Highway Project), and at the same time annoying EAOs, would not only would affect these projects but may also upset people of Mizoram, Manipur, and Nagaland, who would be uncomfortable seeing their ethnic people suffering in the hands of Junta inside the Myanmar border.
Nonetheless, India will not take long to tilt towards NUG (that would be a natural fit) in any case; understanding Junta is unlikely to recover.
What about Bangladesh?
Interestingly, there has not been a visible reaction in Bangladesh on the recent developments in Myanmar. It seems Dhaka is inward-looking about the ongoing issues in Myanmar in general and Rakhine in particular, as we are housing about a million-plus Myanmar nationals in our soil from the Rakhine State. It is very clear that the military mind of the Junta, under Senior General Min Aung Hla, is not going to take back the Rohingyas. If at all they accept a token repatriation under the prevailing precarious situation that would be to their advantage.
It may be remembered, if someday Aung Sun Su Kyi led NUG comes to power accepting the Rohingya back to Rakhine would depend on the political will of AA and its political wing United League of Arakan (ULA). While AA and people of Rakhine are suffering from the “Four Cut Strategy” of Junta, and ULA is desperately looking for humanitarian help (food and medicine) for civilians, the indifference of Dhaka may have ramifications in Rohingya repatriation in future.
It is understandable this is a difficult decision to make and there are risks involved. However, it is necessary to study the pros and cons of taking a calculated risk.
Recommendations
It is recommended to debate whether humanitarian support can be extended to civilians in Rakhine at the request of NUG (regarded as legitimate representative of people) at National Committee for Security Affairs (NCSA) or at the parliament when it is formed again after the election in Bangladesh.
Alternatively, it may be also debated if the international community’s and NGO’s initiated humanitarian support for Rakhine civilians can be permitted using Bangladesh territory (EAOs have captured a number of crossing points and townships along the Indian, Chinese and Thai border where supports for civilian do not need Junta’s approval anymore). There is an opportunity that the US-Burma Act of non-lethal and technical assistance could equally benefit the Rohingya and Rakhines in Rakhine State and bolster cooperation between communities.
Arakan Rohingya National Alliance (ARNA) and other Rohingya organizations may maintain close liaison with AA and NUG at this critical time to remain relevant.
In every challenging situation there are opportunities. But the irony is that the window of opportunity does not remain open forever. Is the opportunity for the Rohingya slipping away?
Lt Gen (Retd) Mohammad Mahfuzur Rahman, PhD, is the Former principal staff officer of the Armed Forces Division.