The current spell of Bangladesh's economic growth shouldn’t surprise a student of history, because this is a reflection of the fact that this region has shown more growth than stagnation throughout its long history, with some exceptions. For example, in around 1650, this region’s contribution to the world’s GDP was about 12% and around 50% of India’s.
Even as recently as 1970, on the eve of the Liberation War, Bangladesh's GDP was close to 10 billion, just a billion below West Pakistan’s, but three-fold more than Hong Kong, Malaysia, and Singapore. One might ask how these three countries could get past Bangladesh and why Bangladesh hasn’t been able to catch up with them get?
A more important question, therefore, is whether Bangladesh’s current economic growth is sustainable, say in the run upto 2041? I suggest that the answer depends on the state of the country’s natural environment and their uses.
Natural capital
Of the three main components of the GDP as a recently reconceptualized category, "natural capital" is declining across the world. How does that tally with Bangladesh? I will try to address this by positioning Bangladesh’s water resources. Because water is the biggest backward linkage for Bangladesh. Especially because almost all of Bangladesh is a basin, literally the sink in your kitchen, but the tap that controls the flow of water is somewhere else.
Since around 93% of the surface water is sourced in transboundary rivers, any discussion on Bangladesh agriculture should prioritize the issues relating to the availability of transboundary waters.
After the partition in 1947, Bangladesh had about 56,000 cubic metres of fresh water per capita. In recent years, this has come down to less than 8,000(an 8-fold decline). You can imagine the underlying causes for such significant reduction in water availability.
Although the Farakka has affected both Indian and Bangladeshi sides of the Sundarbans, most impacts have been on the agriculture of southwestern Bangladesh because of the decline of the distributaries of the Padma, including the Madhumati-Gorai systems.
Farakka’s impact on Rajshahi division and upper region of Khulna division is common knowledge. Barrages on Teesta have also left an evident impact on the Rangpur Division. Meaning, the anthropogenic intervention on the rivers across the borders have affected the agriculture on which more than 50 million people depend.
Environmental shocks in these regions include loss of soil nutrients and productivity, among many other problems.
Agricultural impact
Recent agricultural productivity in Bangladesh is highly appreciated, and is a matter of great pride. However, in terms of Total Factor Productivity, Bangladesh's agriculture sector is less productive compared to India, China, Libya, or Brunei. The factors of relatively low productivity, despite the government’s budgetary priority, is generally explained in terms of the absence of strong institutions, high cost of input, and insufficient investment. In terms of high input cost, if we take the example of the use of fertilizer, its use per hectare has almost doubled over the past one decade (2007-2018).
But beyond the increased production cost, this trend denotes that the natural generation of soil nutrients have declined or stopped. Excessive use of inorganic fertilizer itself has huge environmental consequences, including soil acidification, harmful algae in the water, and high nitrous oxide emission.
There is also an alarming trend in the shrinking of agricultural land, about 700 square kilometres per year due to fast urbanization, industrialization, and infrastructural developments. The shrinking of agro-ecological bases leads to intense competition for the remaining resources, often resulting in land-grabbing by politically-influential people. 85% of the day labourers responding to a survey show the daily income plunging to about Tk 50-60 in the Rangpur region. The results are poor health, poor shelter, malnutrition, and, in extreme cases, localized and seasonal famine.
Foodgrain import has been steadily increasing with record high in pre-Covid 2017-18, and second highest amid the pandemic. These are not merely a reflection of the challenges of more mouths to feed, but also of how Bangladesh is losing its grip on the agro-ecological bases of food production. Bangladesh currently ranks 84 out of 113 countries, lowest in Asia, in the Global Food Security Index.
Where is the economy heading?
So, what does this scenario tell about the possible trajectories in the economy? A note on structural shifts in demography may be useful here. Due to environmental decline in western and northern Bangladesh, cross-border Bangladeshi migrations to India were frequently reported from the 1970s through the 1980s.
However, since the 1990s, migrations from the peripheries of Bangladesh have been clearly towards Dhaka and Chittagong. It is also interesting to note that about 60% of rickshaw pullers come from the two divisions most affected by Farakka and Teesta barrages.
The only region that is still not exposed to severe environmental shocks is northeastern Bangladesh in the Meghna-Surma basin. However, India is constructing the Tipaimukh Dam and is planning to commission the dam in the foreseeable future. This will mean similar environmentally-induced economic and social disruptions in both Manipur in India as well as the Sylhet division.
Worth about $40 billion, Sylhet division represents the third largest economy in Bangladesh, larger than that of Nepal and Afghanistan and way more than the combined GDP of India’s Seven Sisters, excluding Assam. So, environmental shocks in the Sylhet region similar to Khulna, Rajshahi, and Rangpur divisions can mean further spatial inequality in the distribution of national wealth. India’s river-linking project will multiply these impacts to a much higher extent.
The crucial question, thus, is whether the rapid urbanization and booming industrial and service sector of Bangladesh can accommodate the continuous flow of environmentally-induced poor migrants, often subjected to a minimum living standard. The answer largely depends on the state of natural resources on which the current industrial development depends.
Here, again, comes the question of water.
Currently, Dhaka’s water table is receding by three to five metres per year, and by 2030, the current ground water level of 78 metres is projected to shrink to 132 meters. The depletion is taking place faster in the areas where RMG units are clustered. If the target of RMG export is $66bn by 2030, it will cost 2,464 million cubic metres of fresh groundwater per year. But by that time, there may not be enough water left.
If economic growth has to negotiate between the cheap-labour-loving world system and green governance in the coming decades, then the next industrial nerve centre may rotate to Gabon or Liberia which, among other countries, command more natural capital than Bangladesh.
Bangladesh: The future carbon emitter?
Ironically, when this happens, sometime around 2041, Bangladesh would perhaps be a fully-grown middle income country, but with a visible carbon emission of at least 2% of the world’s total, if it does not commit itself to net zero emission.
Already, Bangladesh’s production and consumption of carbon per capita is higher than its GDP per capita. This means the moral ground of championing climate victims and demanding for climate compensation would also be lost for Bangladesh.
A couple of words on policy issues. Climate change is a major challenge. However, climate change seems to have either surpassed or encompassed all other earth-bound environmental issues, with a number of major, broader implications for Bangladesh. This has deflected the attention away from the impact of the intervention on transboundary rivers across the border.
Secondly, the discourse of climate pandemic has veiled the process of the more immediate anthropogenic destruction of biodiversity and water bodies, often by politically-connected forces. Thirdly, the force of the climate change meta-narrative has invited the largest of all integrated projects in Bangladesh since independence, the Delta Plan. From the experience of FAP, we all know such mega projects come at a cost. Neo-liberalism is interesting enough, but when it takes the colour of green, that’s even more intriguing.
To conclude, by 2041, Bangladesh may well be a high-income country if measured by GDP. But economists are already expressing concerns about the mounting challenges that will accompany such graduation. One of the gravest challenges is, however, is expected to be from the diminishing base of natural capital. 2041 in that context might well be Bangladesh’s tipping point.
If Bangladesh wants to avert a steep fall, the foremost question that will arise is this: When Bangladesh surpasses Singapore or South Korea, can this gain be scaffolded by a university like National University of Singapore or a corporation like Samsung?
To achieve that, Bangladesh needs a stable ecosystem of financial regularities, institutionalized democracy, independent judiciary, distributive justice, and a sound knowledge society.
Iftekhar Iqbal is Associate Professor, Universiti Brunei Darussalam. iftekhar.iqbal@ubd.edu.bn. This article is based on a paper presented at the conference, “Fifty years of Bangladesh :Retrospect and Prospect” on December 9, 2021 organized by the Centre for Policy Dialogue and South Asia Program, Cornell University.