“Prisms” cannot always capture “instincts.” Prisms are intellectual (ivory-tower) constructs shaping public mindsets or policy-making, whereas instincts reflect personal experiences from ground realities. Russia and the West interpret Ukraine differently because their premise differs from each other: Historical Russian experiences (instincts) versus prism-driven Western interpretations/expectations (especially about NATO).
Russia’s experiences with the West have mostly been under the circumstances of being invaded. Going back, Adolf Hitler’s Russian invasion in June 1941, Tsar Nikolai II warding Enver Pasha off in 1914, Napoleon Bonaparte’s brief capture of Moscow in September 1812, Peter, the future “Great,” defeating Sweden at Poltava in 1709, and Ivan, who may have been “Terrible,” but actually saved Crimea from Ottoman Turks in 1568. Even eastern Mongols ruled Russia from the 1230s to 1470s.
Self-defense dominates Russia’s genes. This is why democracy remains subordinate to security and why what the West sees as Russian expansion actually reflects their defensiveness. Tsar Alexander I, who pushed Napoleon all the way back to Paris in 1814, controlled all of West Europe until Austria’s Foreign Minister, Clemens von Metternich (1809-48), developed a prism: “Balance of power” diplomacy (which influenced US National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger so much against the Soviet Union in the early 1970s). Great Britain’s most glorious chapter came as Europe’s balancer (much as Kissinger wanted China to be in the Cold War). Diplomatic skills as these conspicuously absent themselves over Ukraine today, leaving Russia and the West too far apart.
Hitler’s failure to capture Moscow exposed how instincts overcame prisms. Desperately needing oil, he suddenly dashed south towards the Caspian Sea, but was halted at Stalingrad in 1942-3 by Marshal Vasily I. Chuikob, this irreversibly changed the WWII tide. Pushing Germans back, General Georgy Konstantinovich Zhukov forced them to eventually surrender in Berlin in 1945. Winston Churchill coined an “Iron Curtain” prism. As a realpolitik “virgin,” the clueless United States plunged into the Cold War.
East Europe may have fallen to the Soviet Union, but part of it was part of the Slav family spilling into Russia. When the Mongols targeted the Middle East Holy Lands, Russians shifted their “first” capital, Kyiv, to Moscow. If Russians could compromise Kyiv then, why could Putin not be negotiated into not invading Ukraine now? Why did Ukraine’s possible NATO membership get dangled in the first place? That membership is neither on the “table,” nor even in any “pipeline.” One might ask which is worse: Falsifying or elevating a sine qua non policy possibility, or armed intervention itself?
No Russian policy-maker can forget historical lessons. Adroit Putin sees current West European disarray opening opportunities for Russia (much as Alexander I did in 1814). With West Europe more stooped in democracy than ever, thus slower in decision-making than autocrats, Putin can extend his distaste for domestic democracy abroad, while also exploiting diminishing “Atlanticist” moods. US President Joe Biden, French President Emmanuel Macron, and the German Chancellor Olaf Scholz parlayed with Putin, but separately, prioritizing three different agendas and eliciting three different answers. For plotters like Putin, division and confusion are the stuff of vital strategic value.
Of course, the leading Atlanticist (or dominant Western representative), remains the US. It does not speak alone for the Atlantic community anymore. Yet, how it treats its own historical soft spot, Cuba, seems less different than how Russia treats Ukraine. President James Monroe’s broader December 1823 declaration of taking the Western Hemisphere away from Europe allowed sugar producers to instigate the Cuban independence war against Spain from 1895 (Spain was defeated and the Philippines was taken as spoils of victory in 1898 -- without any European murmur). The Monroe Doctrine spirit is also embedded in how Latin trade is nudged towards North America rather than West Europe presently. In the final analysis, “America” has become a reference to only the US, and no other, older countries in the continent.
Nikita Khrushchev challenged this mindset by installing IL-28 missiles in Cuba. The Cuban missile crisis of October 1962 became an “eyeball-to-eyeball” confrontation between the navies of the world’s two atomic/nuclear powers. Cuba’s “US backyard” status was confirmed (in return, the US dismantled missiles in Turkey), yet Ukraine as Russia’s “backyard” is contested. When the former Soviet Union became the Commonwealth of Independent States in 1991, Putin was the Deputy Mayor of St Petersburg under Anatoly Subchak. He was alarmed because, by replacing communism, Boris Yeltsin’s democracy and liberalism produced coup attempts, lawlessness filled the streets, while billionaires scavenged the country’s resources. When Putin’s boss was killed and Yeltsin had resigned, both in 1999, common citizens welcomed his return to a modified authoritarian governance. Ever since he manipulated both the prime minister and presidency positions so his full control from 2000 could last until 2036, making him the longest-running ruler of Russia/Soviet Union.
Russians' instinctual preference for security over democracy inverts the Western order, but both approaches have frayed, the former looking too authoritarian, the latter too populist. The common result: Unilateral behaviour, exemplified most by former US President Donald J Trump condoning the January 6, 2021 Congress attack. Against Putin’s warm relations with Trump, Biden/Macron/Scholz looks like second-fiddle global players. It entails a push-back from prisms to instincts.
To the above cauldron we must add two secular forces: Media brouhaha running riot over possible conflicts, and China constantly clipping US’s wings outside Europe. Whereas the media seeks action (read: War) to boost sales, Putin’s gas-deal with China compensates for Germany shutting gas imports from Russia, and by creating Donbas to generate domestic Ukranian legitimacy, Putin also alerts Belorussia and other neighbors of what could happen in the event of defiance. His czarist style possibly showcases 21st century global politics. Would a neutralized Ukraine -- that is, without a NATO ghost -- not produce a more livable atmosphere?
The West carries all the legitimate cards: Russia brazenly violates the UN Charter, suppresses democratic Ukraine, and threatens a EU stuttering to find composure after the UK left. In a pandemic-fueled atmosphere facing inflation, looming energy crunch, and loss of entrepreneurial confidence, complications thicken while compromises evaporate.
Europe last faced this quagmire after WWI, when populism and pandemic, a one-sided economic growth, stock-market crash in 1929, and a decade-long depression ruled. WWII became most predictable in spite of British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain claiming “peace in our lifetime” in 1938. That same peace is not at hand in Ukraine. Though the infamous 1939 Nazi-Soviet Pact may be replicated with China (given the Beijing Winter Olympics deals in February 2022), China is no fool to go 100% either way: It too has border differences with Russia.
Many countries have a similar backyard Cuba ghost: Great Britain with Northern Ireland; France with the Low Countries (Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands); Germany with Poland; Pakistan in Afghanistan; and so forth. When Russia coughs over Ukraine, will a flu dissemble across the planet, like the pandemic did?
Instincts must be tamed, but what kind of a prism matters: Quid pro quo bargaining leads to virtuous gains (avert impending invasions), sine qua non to vicious cycles (Ukraine’s possible NATO membership). Future historians may remedy mistakes, but policy-lessons learned today can limit future damages.
Imtiaz A Hussain is a professor at Independent University Bangladesh.