With regards to trade, one of Obama’s greatest shortcomings was the exclusion of Indonesia and the Philippines from the TPP (Trans-Pacific Partnership). Indonesia is the most populous country in ASEAN with 41% of the community’s share, while the Philippines comes in second possessing 16%.
Indonesia is ASEAN’s largest economy in terms of nominal GDP, and the only ASEAN member with a seat in the G20. Its second largest export market is China, with 12.4% of the share, while the US is merely fourth with 8.6%.
Indonesia runs a trade deficit of close to $7 billion with China, as its largest share of imports comes from there. The US is not even within the top five list of importing countries. The archipelago remains a key supplier of LNG (liquefied natural gas) and coal to China’s energy-intensive coastal areas.
Indonesia holds a special place in the hearts of the CCP (Chinese Communist Party) as one of China’s principal commodity suppliers, alongside Latin America and Africa, but likely has the CCP’s predilection due to geographic proximity. China invested heavily in the country’s commodities sectors; around $12bn from 2005 to 2014 in the gas, coal, and oil sectors, and $6.6bn during the same period in the steel industry.
Energy security is paramount for the CCP; investments in neighboring countries and relentless fortification of the People’s Liberation Army reflect its need to protect nearby energy sources and navigation channels to those sources. The Philippines has also welcomed Chinese energy investments. Except, rather artfully, Beijing placed their bets on renewable resources there.
In 2012, China invested $4.9bn in the country’s agricultural sector for the production of ethanol and bio-ethanol, securing one million hectares for the cultivation of high-yielding strains of corn, rice, and sorghum required in ethanol production. Ethanol processing plants, cold-storage facilities, and shipyards are also being constructed for the eventual export of this renewable energy to China.
The Philippines is a vital trading partner of the US and its inclusion in the TPP could further secure its place in Washington’s periphery, leaving it less susceptible to Beijing’s influence.
China has a slightly larger share of the country’s imports, at 13.1% compared to the US’ 10.9% -- a gap small enough for the US to close. Trumping China as the country’s main importee would come closer to fruition under the auspices of a Philippine membership in the TPP.
However, it is overriding that we return to the question of Indonesia, as it is the largest economy in ASEAN with the potential to become the “I” in what could be “BRICSI” in a decades time.
It would have been prudent for the Obama administration to include Indonesia in the original TPP grouping. Membership in the TPP may have been able to preclude the inexorable rise of Chinese investment and trade deficit in the country.
Indonesia is at a critical juncture in its history, as it departs from its historically protectionist stance. Last month, President Widodo announced reforms to liberalise sectors with as much as full foreign ownership in some, 67% in health-care, and around 49% in one’s surrounding transportation.
Further allaying investors’ fears, last month, he took steps to strengthen the Corruption Eradication Commission by gainsaying proposed legislative amendments designed to limit the Commission’s freedom of investigation.
As Indonesia’s vibrant and lucrative industries open up, large Chinese SOEs and privatised firms with state backing will be more effective in consolidating themselves in the archipelago than their American counterparts. Over the past few years, we have witnessed numerous foreign buyouts by the Chinese. In fact, ChemChina is presently offering $44bn for Swiss agrochemical giant, Syngenta. They seem to have blank checks.
Given Indonesia’s potential, its inclusion in the TPP is indispensable. In fact, a recent IMF (International Monetary Fund) forecast posits Indonesia to sustain close to 5.6% average annual growth, starting this year, going up to 2020, standing third after India (7.6%) and China (6.2%).
Furthermore, Indonesia is a country of relatively little debt compared to the US itself and India. The ratio of public debt to GDP in the US is 100%, in India it’s 50%, and in Indonesia it’s only 27%. Coupled with a populist reform-minded leadership stabilising the country, and making it more business-friendly by opening up industries and enacting fiscally responsible measures like abolishing fuel subsidies, investors are assured of high returns by virtue of prolonged boost to productivity.
If the US doesn’t jump on this growth bandwagon, China will ride it to the ground, leaving nothing behind for Washington and its friends. And it’s not too late. The US can leverage China’s brutally indebted economy hanging off the precipice; its non-financial debt now stands at 250% of GDP.
This egregious debt trickles down to the “well-performing” companies in pursuit of foreign acquisitions. American firms with capital to invest abroad tend to have better balance sheets, and therefore are more likely to upend Chinese competitors in the long run.
As China’s faltering economy engenders revelations of structural weaknesses inside its investing apparatus, the TPP will inadvertently grow stronger, paving the way for Obama’s “Pivot to Asia” policy to adopt a more assertive posture in the region.
However, this is only possible through pre-emptive economic patronage of developing nations in Southeast Asia like Indonesia, the Philippines, Cambodia, and Laos. Soft power may be Obama’s only power in this plight.