The relationship between India and Bangladesh did not begin with diplomacy; it was forged in a shared struggle for identity, dignity, and independence. Few bilateral ties in South Asia carry as much history as this one. Bangladesh's liberation in 1971 remains the most powerful foundation of this bilateral friendship, and that history still shapes how the two neighbours view one another. But history alone is not enough. What matters now is whether both sides can translate that legacy into a steadier, more confident partnership.
Today, India and Bangladesh are working to recalibrate bilateral ties after the 2024 political upheaval in Dhaka. Bangladesh Foreign Minister Khalilur Rahman's three-day visit to New Delhi in April marked a key diplomatic outreach to reset and stabilise relations. The relationship remains too important — economically, geographically, and strategically — for either side to allow short-term political developments to define its long-term trajectory.
The weight of history
India's role during Bangladesh's Liberation War created a bond that was not only diplomatic but deeply emotional. For many in Bangladesh, that memory remains central to the national story. The legacy of Rabindranath Tagore is claimed by both, Nazrul Islam bridges the same fault lines, and the families, languages, and food traditions that straddle the border have kept ordinary people connected even when governments have not. The Ganga Water Treaty, for all its technical complexity, carries something of that same civilizational weight. The shared history forms the bedrock that has held the relationship together through several rough patches. Today, the region has changed too much for goodwill alone to be a strategy. Therefore, with the changing geopolitical realities and an evolving security architecture, a strategic renewal is necessary. It does not require forgetting history. It requires using that history as a foundation for better engagement in the present.
The Hasina era: A decade of deepened ties
Any honest accounting of India–Bangladesh relations must acknowledge what the Hasina years represented. The period from 2009 to 2024 was the most productive phase in bilateral history. Sheikh Hasina's government made a decisive choice to prioritise cooperation with India, and the results were tangible on both sides.
On security, Dhaka's sustained action against insurgent groups that had long used Bangladeshi territory to stage attacks on India's northeast transformed the bilateral atmosphere and resolved a concern that had shadowed the relationship for decades. On trade and infrastructure, the two sides launched the India–Bangladesh Friendship Pipeline, expanded rail and road corridors, opened border haats, and deepened power interconnections. India, for its part, extended significant credit lines, invested in development projects, and offered preferential market access. The relationship during those years demonstrated what was possible when both governments chose partnership over suspicion. That institutional momentum remains the strongest practical foundation for what comes next.
India's concerns and the path to confidence
Candour requires acknowledging that India approaches the post-2024 transition in Bangladesh with certain reservations, and these are not manufactured anxieties. They stem from a well-documented record. The BNP and its allied formations have, at various points, maintained ties with elements that New Delhi regards as hostile to Indian interests, whether Islamist groups or networks accused of facilitating cross-border destabilisation. During earlier periods of BNP governance, cooperation on counterterrorism and insurgency containment was limited, and India's northeastern security calculus was correspondingly more strained.
Indian strategic thinking also notes that the BNP has historically been less enthusiastic than the Awami League about bilateral connectivity projects and regional economic integration. Whatever the reasons — genuine policy disagreement or domestic electoral calculus — the effect was to slow the pace of projects that served both countries' interests.
The BNP has never hidden its preference for a wider set of partners, and Beijing fits that bill. Unlike its predecessor, the party has shown genuine appetite for deeper Chinese engagement, diplomatically and economically. India, which spent the Hasina years watching that influence get carefully managed, now has fewer guarantees it will be. Also, the 1996 Ganga Water Treaty expires in December 2026, and its absence from Khalilur Rahman's New Delhi agenda was a gap neither side can afford to ignore for much longer.
These concerns do not make renewed engagement impossible. They make it more demanding. The Tarique Rahman government will need to demonstrate, through consistent decisions over time, not merely through diplomatic statements, that Bangladesh's strategic posture is stable and that its territory will not become a haven for groups working against its neighbours. That is not an unreasonable expectation. It is the minimum basis for a serious bilateral relationship. India, for its part, would benefit from extending the new government a genuine opportunity to build that record rather than prejudging the outcome.
Trade, connectivity, and energy
The economic logic for a strong relationship remains compelling regardless of who governs in Dhaka. The relationship already has a strong commercial base, but it still has room to grow, and trade is the way forward. According to the Export Promotion Bureau, in the fiscal year 2024-25, Bangladesh’s exports to India grew 12.4 percent; to $1.76 billion, up from $1.57 billion the previous year. There was robust growth in footwear products (43 percent), fisheries (42 percent), and readymade garments (17.38 percent). Bangladesh also imports around $9 billion worth of goods annually from India, reflecting the scale of cross-border supply chain integration that neither side has an interest in disrupting.
Connectivity is equally important. Roads, railways, border crossings, and transport corridors may not make headlines, but they are where economic relationships either function or do not. For Bangladesh, better connectivity with India means cheaper logistics. Faster trade and greater access to regional markets. For India, especially its landlocked northeastern states, Bangladesh is not merely a neighbour — it is a gateway.
Energy cooperation reinforces this interdependence further. The India–Bangladesh Friendship Pipeline, running from Siliguri to Parbatipur, is a good example of India's sustained support even during global energy disruptions.
Strategic balancing and the blue economy
China’s expanding footprint in South Asia is not a secret, and both New Delhi and Dhaka are navigating it in real time. For Bangladesh, engaging multiple partners is a sensible development strategy, not a provocation. For India, the priority is a neighbourhood that does not become a theatre for rival influence. These interests are not inherently in conflict, but they do require some honest dialogue. Strategic balancing here is not about choosing sides; it is about creating a resilient partnership that advances shared interests while adapting to an evolving regional order.
The Bay of Bengal is where this gets genuinely interesting. Chattogram and Mongla are not just Bangladesh’s ports; they are, in a real sense, India’s eastern maritime access points too. Fisheries, offshore energy, coastal trade, and disaster management are all areas where joint work makes obvious sense and where neither country has anything to lose by cooperating. Zoom out further, and both nations sit at the edge of the Indo-Pacific, which means BIMSTEC and related frameworks are not bureaucratic exercises, they are the architecture through which both countries can eventually punch above their individual weight in a region increasingly shaped by larger powers.
A practical way forward
India and Bangladesh do not need a new relationship. They need a renewed framework for managing an increasingly complex region. After Hasina’s fall, the Yunus interlude, and now a BNP government under Tarique Rahman, Bangladesh has moved through a lot of political turbulence fast, and the full consequences are still working themselves out.
For Bangladesh, staying close to India is not just about sentiment; it is about development finance, market access, energy supply, and regional stability. For India, a functional Bangladesh matters enormously to its northeastern strategy and to the broader argument that it can be a reliable partner in its own neighbourhood.
For India, a stable Bangladesh strengthens its eastern neighbourhood and serves wider regional stability. The logic is straightforward: when the two countries cooperate, both are stronger.
The institutional gains of the Hasina era should not be squandered. They represent the high-water mark of what this partnership can achieve when political will aligns with strategic interest. The task now is to protect those gains, address legitimate concerns on both sides with honesty and patience, and build incrementally on the foundation that history and a decade of productive diplomacy has already laid.