Bangladesh’s July 2024 uprising constituted a “decisive rupture” in the country’s contemporary political order, reshaping power relations while opening an uncertain transition marked by reform pressures, elite bargaining, and rising public anxiety, according to a new governance study unveiled on Sunday.
The findings were presented at an exclusive roundtable discussion with senior media leaders, held at Milonpur, Brac Tower, organized by the Brac Institute of Governance and Development (BIGD).
Titled “Rupture, Reform, and Reimagining Democracy: Navigating the Agony of Transition,” the session shared key insights from the State of Governance Research Project 2024–2025, which examines Bangladesh’s political trajectory following the July uprising.
The discussion was led by BIGD’s senior leadership, including Executive Director Dr Imran Matin, Dr Mirza M Hassan, Dr Asif Shahan, and Syeda Salina Aziz, who collectively unpacked the structural, political, and social dynamics that emerged after the fall of the Awami League-led dominant-party regime.
According to the report, what began as student-led demands for quota reform rapidly escalated into a nationwide political movement that ultimately dismantled the long-entrenched ruling order.
The study identifies three primary drivers behind the regime’s collapse: entrenched political inequality, the rapid expansion of solidarities, and the catalytic role of digital networks. Decades of exclusionary governance and patron-clientelist politics, the researchers argue, systematically marginalized large sections of the population, creating fertile ground for mass mobilisation.
As the movement spread, it evolved from a local grievance into a broader struggle sustained by physical, material, and digital solidarities—both domestically and from the diaspora. Viral images of state violence and the “memefication” of resistance further strengthened a psychological sense of national unity against what participants increasingly viewed as a common adversary.
The report characterizes the post-uprising phase under the interim government, led by Dr Muhammad Yunus, as an “equilibrium of the weak”—a fragile political balance in which state capacity is constrained by competing actors and unresolved power struggles.
While the government initially enjoyed high public approval, its legitimacy has since fluctuated amid challenges related to law and order, incidents of mob violence, and persistent economic pressures.
Survey data presented in the study reveal what the researchers describe as a “paradox of expectations.” Public optimism about the country moving in the right direction fell sharply—from 71% in August 2024 to 42% by July 2025—even as demands for swift elections intensified.
The absence of an elected government, the report notes, has emerged as one of the public’s most pressing concerns.
The post-July political landscape has also witnessed a significant circulation of elites and a discernible shift to the right.
Islamist political forces, particularly Jamaat-e-Islami, have transitioned from being “political pawns” within the old order to independent and consequential actors, the study finds.
At the same time, youth-led political formations such as the National Citizen Party (NCP) face difficulties in transforming decentralised, horizontal movements into durable party structures capable of electoral competition.
Meanwhile, the Awami League and the Jatiya Party have become “political pariahs” in the new order, while left-wing politics remains further marginalized.
The study describes the current transition as a “refolution”—a hybrid process in which revolutionary pressure forces an incumbent state to pursue reforms rather than being fully overthrown.
However, the report warns of three “morbid symptoms” threatening the reform agenda.
These include the rise of far-right groups exploiting instability as “free riders,” bureaucratic resistance from entrenched civil administration elites who have stalled transformative change, and elite-centric reform negotiations that largely exclude women, minorities, and the wider public.
Although a “July Charter” has been signed to safeguard core reform commitments, the researchers caution that the consensus remains fragile. With many key reforms deferred until after elections, the prospects for meaningful transformation will depend on future political contestation—both in Parliament and on the streets.
